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helping local governments in advanced economies to adjust their fiscal po-
sitions in response to budget shocks. At the same time, little is known about
the dynamic of fiscal adjustments at the local level in emerging economies,
and there are reasons to expect distinct fiscal stabilization patterns, for in-
stance, due to weaker institutional arrangements and lower fiscal capacity.
However, using a panel data set of more than 900 municipalities in Colom-
bia over the period 1985-2015, I find that in line with the results for devel-
oped countries (i) intergovernmental grants react significantly to increases
in government spending; (ii) the response of own-source revenues to inno-
vations in government spending in large cities is higher than in the small
ones; (iii) government investment is highly volatile and responds remark-
ably to innovations in all other budgetary components; and (iv) there is
no strong empirical evidence of a reduction in fiscal effort as a result of in-
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1. Introduction
Previous studies on fiscal performance at the local level in advanced economies point
out that own-source revenues, intergovernmental grants, and changes in government
investment play amajor role in helping local governments to adjust their fiscal positions
in response to budget shocks (Bessho andOgawa, 2015; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro,
2012; Buettner, 2009; Buettner and Wildasin, 2006). In emerging economies, however,
there are reasons to expect different fiscal adjustment patterns such as weaker sub-
national own-revenue systems, higher levels of fiscal disparities, rent-seeking behavior
and corruption, the composition of government spending, coordination failures in the
conduct of fiscal policy, and bailout expectations, among others (Bird, 2012; Bird and
Fiszbein, 2008; Acosta and Bird, 2005). Despite this widespread view, there is a lack of
empirical evidence supporting some of these hypotheses.
This article aims to fill this gap in knowledge by using a panel data set of more than
900 municipalities in Colombia over the period 1985-2015. The Colombian case is in-
teresting for three reasons. First, it is one of the most decentralized public systems in
Latin America. For instance, the share of local spending in total public expenditures
increased from 18,5% in 1995 to 36,8% in 2012, and intergovernmental grants as a per-
centage of national government expenditures rose from 46,7% in 1995 to 62,9% in 2012.
Second, during the last three decades, Colombia has embarked on a political and fis-
cal decentralization program. Its purpose has been to transfer responsibilities from
higher levels of government to lower ones in order to improve the efficiency in service
delivery (Manor, 1999; Mello, 2000; Rodden, 2002).1 Nevertheless, this process is still
a work in progress (Bird, 2012). Some authors claim that there is a problematic trans-
fer system, limited tax autonomy, and important concerns about how to control sub-
national spending to avoid overborrowing and overspending. Third, over the period
of analysis, approximately 10% of all municipalities in Colombia declared themselves
in bankruptcy and followed specify debt restructuring programs under the Law 550 of
1999.2 It is thus relevant to recognize the fiscal constraints that Colombian sub-national
units face when they react to changes in their budgets and the decisions they make.
1See Channa and Faguet (2012) and Blume and Voigt (2011) for comprehensive and recent surveys
of related work and its shortcomings. In general, the empirical evidence about the impact of more
decentralized public systems on economic outcomes has pointed out mixed and inconclusive results.
2Notice that, however, I exclude these municipalities from the analysis below since I am interested in
studying sustainable fiscal policies. A detailed description of the effects of these legal regulations on
local public finances in Colombia can be found in MinHacienda (2015) and MinHacienda (2016).
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Surprisingly, despite the facts that fiscal autonomy to raise own-source revenues and
less transfer dependency are associated with higher levels of efficiency in delivering
government services (Martínez, 2016; Bird, 2012), the Colombian fiscal scheme relies
on large portions of grants going to local budgets (Faguet and Sánchez, 2014; Cortés,
2010; Sánchez, 2006). For instance, Gemmell et al. (2013) support the hypothesis that if
local governments acquire more administrative powers or autonomy to manage their
budgets, especially on the side of their revenues, then it will generate higher levels of
investment and enhance economic growth. However, as Sánchez (2006) and Martínez
(2016) point out, intergovernmental transfers can have a negative effect on the local
government behavior in terms of limited incentives to increase their own-source rev-
enues to finance local productive spending.3 Although to estimate the effect of grants
or own-source revenues in delivery services is an important task, the purpose of this
paper, instead, is to assess how local governments in Colombia maintain their fiscal
solvency in response to budget imbalances, to determine what sort of policies they im-
plement, and the role of intergovernmental grants in this context. Understanding this
process is crucial because there is evidence that reductions in government spending or
increases in tax rates, following fiscal consolidation programs, could have differential
impacts on fiscal sustainability and economic growth (Alesina and Ardagna, 2013).4
My contribution to the literature in this research is thus threefold. First, I revisit the
question about the dynamic interrelationship between revenues and expenditures at
the local level, by using more disaggregated data on both the revenue and expenditure
side following the specification proposed by Bessho and Ogawa (2015). Second, to the
best of my knowledge, I provide the first empirical analysis on the fiscal adjustment
process at the sub-national level in a developing country and relate the main results
to the experiences in advanced economies. Third, given that the local governments in
Colombia show important differences in terms of their fiscal autonomy, types of expen-
diture and responsibilities (Bird, 2012), I also compare the degree of fiscal adjustment
across local governments bearing in mind population size, the level of local GDP per
capita, and fiscal decentralization indicators.
3Bonet-Morón et al. (2017) and Cadena (2002) find that the increases in intergovernmental transfers did
not have a negative effect on fiscal efforts across municipalities in Colombia.
4Using data for OECD countries, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) show that in a process of fiscal adjust-
ment, spending cuts, in comparison with tax increases, are related to higher reductions in deficits
and debt to GDP ratios. In the same vein, Glomm et al. (2018) estimate short- and long-run welfare
effects of distinct austerity measures, and find that spending cuts, relatively to tax-based policies,
lead to higher steady-state output.
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As in previous studies on fiscal adjustments at the local level, I estimate a panel
vector error-correction model assuming that the local governments commit to satisfy
an intertemporal budget constraint, in order to evaluate how local governments re-
store their fiscal solvency over time when they face unexpected changes in their fis-
cal deficits and public debt levels. In line with the effects that report some interna-
tional studies in developed economics e.g., Japan, Spain, Germany or the United States
(Bessho and Ogawa, 2015; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2012; Buettner, 2009; Buet-
tner and Wildasin, 2006), my results consistently show that intergovernmental grants
and changes in government investment play an important role in helping subnational
units to reduce their fiscal deficits. Likewise, my estimations also highlight that there
are perverse incentives in the Colombian fiscal scheme since local governments could
induce more grants by increasing their spending, a fact that has also been shown for
developed countries. Moreover, it is worth noting that, in contrast to the cases in the
United States and Germany, own-source revenues in large cities respond to a higher
extent to changes in other budgetary variables. This suggests that they could be in a
better position to ensure themselves against common and idiosyncratic shocks.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I present a brief liter-
ature review. In section 3, I describe a basic framework for understanding the intertem-
poral budget constraint at the local level. In the section 4, I present the data sets and
point out their main characteristics. In Section 5, the empirical strategy is provided.
Section 6 describes the specification tests used to estimate the model. In section 7, I
point to the main results and perform robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2. Related literature
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the dynamics of fiscal adjustment at
the local level5. For instance, Buettner andWildasin (2006, 2002) analyze these dynamic
interrelationships using US municipal data that covers the period 1972 to 1997. They
estimate a vector-error correction model distinguishing own-source revenue, grants,
expenditures and debt service to point out which elements of the budget local govern-
ments adjust in response to fiscal imbalances. They find that US municipalities change
in a greater extent their government expenditures in response to budget imbalances but
they also present evidence that grants are highly sensitive to local fiscal deficits. In the
5Martín-Rodriguez and Ogawa (2017) provide an excellent recent survey of this literature.
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same line, Buettner (2009) studies the German case during the period 1974-2000 con-
sidering the role of fiscal equalization, through intergovernmental grants, on the local
fiscal balances. He points out that intergovernmental transfers contribute to restoring
the fiscal position in German municipalities in a higher proportion than in US mu-
nicipalities (two or three times greater). However, he also indicates that despite fiscal
equalization transfers, government spending is not less volatile in comparison with the
results for US municipalities.
Likewise, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2012) using the same methodology that
Buettner andWildasin (2006), describe the fiscal adjustment patterns in 258 municipal-
ities in Catalonia, a Spanish region, during the period 1988 to 2006 and compare their
results with those obtained for the United States and Germany in order to take into ac-
count institutional arrangement differences. They find out that local governments have
incentives to increase their expenditures due to expected bailouts from the central gov-
ernment and since the majority of sub-national units have a limited fiscal autonomy,
the own-source revenue has a lower adjustment capacity in that environment.
In a recent work, Bessho and Ogawa (2015) analyze the Japanese case adopting the
same vector-error correctionmodel to estimate local fiscal adjustments. Using a sample
of 3210municipalities for the period 1977-2010 and separating the expenditure side into
investment and current spending, they show that the government investment plays an
important role in the adjustment process and that possibly there is a presence of flypa-
per effects. Finally, other two related works to the analysis of the response to budget
shocks, which follow the approach proposed by Buettner and Wildasin (2002, 2006),
Navon (2006) and Rattso (2004) describe the dynamics of the fiscal adjustment for the
cases of Israel and Norway, respectively.
My main departure is that I measure fiscal adjustments to budget shocks at the local
level in a developing country and divide the expenditure side into current spending,
investment and debt service as in Bessho and Ogawa (2015) and the revenue side into
own-source revenue and intergovernmental transfers, which is an important element in
theColombian local budgets asmentioned above. Likewise, by using the samemethod-
ology as previous studies, I am able to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis
across economies with different institutional arrangements and development levels.
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3. Framework
Consider a small open economy. Following Bohn (2007), the standard budget constraint
at date t for a particular local government i = 1, . . . , N can be written as follows:
Bi,t+1 + Yi,t = Gi,t + (1 + rt)Bi,t (1)
where Bi,t is the level of debt, Yit is total revenues, Gi,t is the non-interest spending,
and r > 0 is the exogenous interest rate. Thus, I can define the with-interest deficitDi,t
as:
Di,t ≡ Bi,t+1 −Bi,t = Gi,t + rBi,t − Yi,t (2)
In this setting, Yi.t and Gi,t are given by:
Yi,t = Ri,t + Ti,t (3)
Gi,t = GCi,t +GIi,t (4)
whereRi,t is own-source revenues (local taxes), Ti,t intergovernmental transfers,GCi,t
government consumption andGIi,t government investment. Hence, if I denote the debt
services rBi,t as DSi,t, then equation (2) can be rewritten as:
Di,t = GCi,t +GIi,t +DSi,t −Ri,t − Ti,t (5)
Likewise, B0 is exogenous and the transversality condition limt→∞ Bt+1(1+r)t = 0 holds,
as it is assumed in the literature, since all debts must be repaid. Notice that in this
framework, given a initial level of debt Bi,t, that in principle Ti,t is exogenous because
it is determined by central government rules, the local government chooses a spending
level Gi,t, a level of debt for the next period Bi,t+1 and how much to tax Ri,t in order to
satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint.
4. Data Description
I observe annual budgetary information over the period 1985 to 2015 for 1033 mu-
nicipalities in Colombia. In order to assess the intertemporal linkages between local
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government expenditures and revenues, and to compare results across municipalities
taking into account their differences in terms of population, income levels, and fiscal
autonomy, I aggregate the budgetary data into five variables as stated above, that is:
Government consumption, government investment, debt service, intergovernmental
grants and own-source revenues as in Bessho and Ogawa (2015). The fiscal deficit is
calculated as described in equation (5).
I drop from the dataset observations with inconsistent values such as negative, zero
or extremely high values for government investment, government consumption, grants,
and/or own-source revenues. After these changes, I ended up with an unbalanced
panel of 1014 municipalities. Since I want to analyze sustainable fiscal policies, I also
proceed to drop local governments who declared themselves in bankruptcy over the
period of analysis (a total of 96 municipalities) and restructured their liabilities by re-
questing financial protection under the Law 550/1999. Notice that this legal framework
allows local governments to recover their fiscal solvency by setting policies based on
spending cuts and revenue increases to service the debt under more favorable condi-
tions.6 Thus, in the analysis below I use data for 918 municipalities.
Following previous literature, I decompose the revenue side in two items. First, own-
source revenues which include direct taxes, indirect taxes, user charges among others.
Second, intergovernmental grants which involve current and capital grants. This item
also includes transfers from natural resource exploitation in form of royalties. Like-
wise, I divide government spending into three items, that is, government consump-
tion, government investment, and debt service. I compute government consumption
as the difference between total spending net of debt services and government invest-
ment. The reason to follow that procedure is twofold. On the one hand, to evaluate the
role of intergovernmental transfers in the fiscal adjustment path as an additional in-
strument for fiscal stabilization. On the other hand, by dividing government spending
as in Bessho and Ogawa (2015), I am able to assess the trade-off that local governments
face when they have to allocate their financial resources between current expenditure
and productive spending.
The underlying data come from the National Planning Department and the Cen-
ter for Economic Development Studies-CEDE (Universidad de Los Andes), with the
exception of the price index and population levels, which are obtained from the Na-
tional Administrative Department of Statistics. All the variables are transformed in
6See Villar et al. (2013) for a detailed explanation of this normative and its fiscal implications.
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per capita basis and deflated to 2008 prices. Thus, values are expressed in millions
of 2008 Colombian Pesos (COP). I report the summary statistics for municipalities in
Table 1. I present the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for
each variable in both levels and differences. In line with previous studies, government
investment and intergovernmental transfers are the most volatile variables, and debt
service seems to be the most stable component in the local government budgets as in
advanced economies. However, it is important to mention that while in Colombia aver-
age own-source revenues only account for approximately 23% of total revenues, in the
United States and Germany own-source revenues attain a participation of around 71%
and 53%, respectively. As mentioned above, these differences relate to the high level of
transfer dependency present in Colombia for government spending.
Likewise, Figure 1 shows the paths of real fiscal variables in Colombian municipal-
ities. It is worth noting that own-source revenues, intergovernmental grants, govern-
ment consumption and government investments have been increasing over the whole
period as a result of the fiscal decentralization process. Finally, a remarkable feature
in the local public finances, that lead to the expedition of the Law 550/1999 and sub-
sequent debt and spending regulations such as the Law 617/2000, was the rise in debt
services between the years 1993-1999 due to the increase in fiscal deficits across munic-
ipalities over those years.
5. Empirical Strategy
To measure the fiscal adjustments to budget imbalances at the local level in Colom-
bia for the period 1985-2015, I proceed to implement the Buettner and Wildasin (2002,
2006) approach. Since fiscal deficit inclusive of debt services turns out to be stationary,
in line with Bohn (1991), government spending (consumption, investment, debt ser-
vice) and government revenues (intergovernmental grants and own-source revenues)
are cointegrated.7
Thus, I consider a vector error-correction representation of the fiscal deficit8, as de-
fined in the previous section, in the following way:
7There is a linear combination of budgetary elements that makes the fiscal deficit stationary, that is,
expenditures and revenues move together over time (Lutkepohl, 2005).
8Notice that I need to check empirically that the assumptions of the model are satisfied. That is, the
deficit is a I(0) process, and that five variables (GCit, GIit, DSit, Rit, Tit) are I(1) processes.
8
∆Xit = θDi,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
Ωj∆Xi,t−j + uit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T
where Xit = (GCit, GIit, DSit, Rit, Tit)′ and ψ = (1, 1, 1,−1,−1) forms the known
cointegrating vector. Thus, Dit = ψ′Xit. The idea behind this methodology is to esti-
mate the dynamic interrelationships between the variables that compose the local bud-
get constraint assuming that the with-interest deficit is stationary in the long run. In
this sense, θ and Ωj are the parameter matrices to be estimated. Following previous
studies, I proceed with equation-by-equation OLS estimations without municipality-
or time-fixed effects. Nevertheless, I run a set of robustness exercises in order to check
the plausibility of this approach.
To interpret the results, I calculate impulse-response functions (fiscal reaction func-
tions) in present-value terms following Bohn (1991) and Buettner and Wildasin (2002,
2006). By doing that, I can estimate how future local fiscal policy responds to unex-
pected changes in current fiscal variables. Firstly, I plot impulse-response functions for
each variable assuming that there are not contemporaneous effects between the vari-
ables in the spirit of Buettner and Wildasin (2006) and Buettner (2009). Secondly, fol-
lowing the procedure of Bessho and Ogawa (2015) I summarize the results through
the calculation of present value responses to temporal and permanent innovations us-
ing a Cholesky decomposition identification scheme based on the variance-covariance
matrix.
Note that this identification strategy imposes additional constraints (zero short-run
restrictions on contemporaneous coefficients) since I need to assume the order of the
variables to get back to the structural representation for attaining identification of the
system (Hamilton, 1994). Thus, I begin ordering government spending variables first
(government consumption, government investment, debt service) and then revenue
variables (intergovernmental grants and own-source revenues). This specific order im-
plies that revenues respond contemporaneously to government spending shocks but
expenditure variables do not respond to innovation in revenue variables within the pe-
riod. Although this particular approach does not follow a theoretical counterpart, the
results are robust to changing the Cholesky ordering, for example, by selecting ran-
domly a specify ordering. In general, the estimated impacts are qualitatively similar
and the quantitative differences are small. It is also worth noting that the point esti-
mates do not differ so much from the ones estimated assuming no contemporaneous
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responses.9
6. Specification tests
As stated above, to estimate a vector error-correction model I need to verify that its
assumptions are satisfied. Therefore, I proceed to check that the deficit is a I(0) pro-
cess, and that five variables (GCit, GIit, DSit, Rit, Tit) are I(1) processes. In order to do
that, notice that I cannot use the Im et al. (2003) and Pesaran (2007) tests as in previ-
ous studies given that I have an unbalanced panel data with gaps in some years. Thus,
I employ Fisher-type unit root tests using augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics on each
panel following the procedure proposed by Choi (2001), which also allows me to con-
trol for heterogeneity and serially correlated errors. Likewise, to determine the number
of lags10 to be included in the OLS estimations and to assess the existence of local fixed
effects11, I estimate likelihood ratio tests for each equation, instead of imposing cross-
equation restrictions for the whole system. By doing so, one can get insights about the
role of municipality-fixed effects on particular budgetary elements.
6.1. Panel unit-root tests
In this subsection, I present the results of panel unit-root tests for each fiscal variable
in order to determine their stationarity. Table 2 reports the unit-root statistics for mu-
nicipalities. The tests for variables in levels include a time trend with the exception of
fiscal deficit, and cross-sectional means are removed. I also use different lag orders to
control for serially correlated errors. These calculations suggest that the fiscal deficit is
stationary and that the first differences of the other budgetary components are also sta-
tionary regardless of the lag order which supports the use of the VECM model. I also
display the results for the variables in levels. Notice that I cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that all the panels contain unit roots for own-source revenues with 1-lag, but once
I include 3-lags I also cannot reject the null for government investment, government
consumption, intergovernmental grants and debt service.
9These estimation results are available upon request.
10According to previous literature, the majority of studies have employed a lag length of four years.
11I do not include time-specific effects since the intertemporal budget constraint should respond to all
innovations and not only to idiosyncratic shocks (Buettner andWildasin, 2006; Buettner, 2009). Nev-
ertheless, I estimate the model using time effects and the results are quite similar. Estimations are
available upon request.
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6.2. Lag selection and local-fixed effects
In order to determine the optimal lag order I begin by using four lags for each variable
as suggested by the previous literature, then I test for a possible reduction in this num-
ber. It is also worth noting that I do not include local fixed effects12 since I introduce
variables in first differences and, to a certain extent, onewould assume that all local gov-
ernments should converge to the same deficit level e.g. zero (Buettner and Wildasin,
2006; Buettner, 2009; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2012; Bessho and Ogawa, 2015).
I check these assumptions using likelihood ratio tests for the equations of my model.
Tables 3 and 4 report the likelihood ratio statistics. For instance, the specification of
lag order in the first column evaluates whether the dynamics of themodel are captured
by three lags (the null hypothesis), in this case, the alternative hypothesis suggests us-
ing four lags. The reduction of lags is always rejected for all the variables, so in the
below estimations, I use a specification with four lags. Likewise, to assess for the ne-
cessity of includingmunicipality-fixed effects, I calculate likelihood ratio tests with two
different lag orders in which the null hypothesis assess whether the model does not re-
quire the use of municipality-fixed effects. For instance, using 4 lags I cannot reject
the null hypothesis for government consumption, government investment, and inter-
governmental grants. However, when I follow the literature and calculate likelihood
ratio tests on cross-equation restrictions using the variance-covariance matrix of the
residuals, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model does not require the use of
municipality-fixed effects. Therefore, for the next exercises, I proceedwith equation-by-
equation OLS estimations without fixed effects since joint estimation does not provide
gains in efficiency given that I use the same set of variables in each equation (Batalgi,
1995; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2012).
7. Main results
In the next subsections, I show the main results by identifying the type of innovation
e.g., temporal or permanent, and the response for each variable. First, I present mu-
nicipal responses to positive innovations in budgetary elements over the period of ten
12Note that the literature recommends using instrumental variables techniques in dynamic panel data
models when regressors include lagged dependent variables in order to reduce the OLS estimate
bias in short panels Buettner (2009). However, since my sample only contains approximately 30 years
for each unit the Nickell (1981) bias should not be large and as suggested by Buettner and Wildasin
(2006) and Buettner (2009) I could neglect this bias when I proceed to test for local-fixed effects.
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years (see Figure 2). As expected, since the variables are not mean reverting, the impact
of innovations do not die out over time, which implies that innovations in this system
have permanent effects on the elements composing the government budget constraint.
Moreover, these results show that adjustments take place in the first five-six years, in-
dicating that local governments require long periods of time to restore their fiscal po-
sitions. Second, for the estimations of the present value responses and for the ease of
comparison, I assume, in the spirit of previous literature, a discount rate of 3%,13 and
interpret the results according to the procedure of Buettner and Wildasin (2006).14
7.1. Results in Colombian municipalities
Table 5 displays the estimates for the error correction term in the sample of Colombian
municipalities. The vector of coefficients θ confirms the error-correction representation
of the fiscal deficit and supports the assumption that the intertemporal budget con-
straint holds in the long run. Notice that a higher deficit has a negative effect in both
types of local government spending e.g., consumption and investment. Likewise, it
has a positive effect on both intergovernmental grants and own-source revenues. Debt
service also responds positively which indicates that a higher fiscal deficit results in a
rise in debt and, as a consequence, higher levels of debt service should be expected. By
comparing these responses with the international evidence for advanced economies in
the spirit of Martín-Rodriguez and Ogawa (2017), one can observe that the response of
grants to one monetary unit increase in fiscal deficits in Colombia is lower (24 cents)
than in Spain (36 cents), but it is surprisingly higher than in the United States (7 cents)
and Germany (5 cents), supporting the idea that the fiscal decentralization process in
Colombia is far from being completed as suggested by Bird (2012). Although it is worth
mentioning that the response of own-source revenues is similar to the ones reported
by the United States and Germany.
Table 6 reports the implied present value responses of each fiscal variable to innova-
tions in both itself and other variables. The columns show how fiscal variables adjust
after a specific innovation in the system and the rows present how a particular vari-
able reacts to unit changes in other variables. For instance, a 1 COP positive innovation
in government consumption in one period is followed by a reduction in future gov-
ernment consumption of 38 cents, and by an increase in government investment of 25
13The results are not sensitive to changes in the discount rate.
14For more details, see Appendix A.
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cents, notice that this latter effect could suggest spending complementarity. Intergov-
ernmental grants and own-source revenues react positively to this innovation with an
increment of 48 cents and 38 cents, respectively. Given that this rise in government con-
sumption could be financed through debt, there is also a positive effect on debt service
of 3 cents. All of these responses are statistically significant.
Furthermore, a 1 COP positive unexpected change in government investment leads
to a decrease in future government investment of 72 cents, which implies that the level
of investment is 28 cents above the level before the innovation takes place. Notice that
in this case, government consumption decreases by 1 cent but this change is not statis-
tically significant, and the debt service increase is minimal. It is also worth noting that
grants and own-source revenues react in a lower extent to a government investment rise
(16 cents and 8 cents, respectively) than to a government consumption increase. All of
these responses are statistically significant and have the expected sign.
A positive unit innovation in grants is followed by a reduction in future grants of 58
cents and 3 cents in own-source revenues, but this response is not significant. Thus, the
latter impact does not support the idea that municipalities whose receive more grants
tend to decrease their fiscal effort Martínez (2016); Faguet and Sánchez (2014), and pro-
vide additional empirical evidence for the no existence of fiscal laziness in Colombia
(see e.g., Bonet-Morón et al. (2017) and Cadena (2002)). Notice, however, that these re-
sults confirm a possible fly-paper effect in Colombian municipalities, given that grants
have a positive and significant effect in future spending, particularly in investment,
with a total increment of 35 cents. These point estimates are in line with the ones re-
ported for US cities where a rise of one monetary unit in grants generates an increment
in expenditures of 34 cents (Buettner and Wildasin, 2006) and for Spanish municipal-
ities where there is a rise in local spending of 29 cents due to an increment in grants
(Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2012). For Germany and Japan, the responses attain a
value of 35 and 55 cents, respectively, according to the estimates in Buettner (2009) and
Bessho and Ogawa (2015). It is also important to mention that, in general, grants can
have significant and positive responses to innovations in local public spending which
suggest that there is a soft-budget constraint problem given that municipalities may
follow an opportunistic behavior (Bessho and Ogawa, 2015).
Moreover, a positive innovation in own-source revenues of 1 COP leads to a decrease
in grants of 1 cents (but this impact is not significant) and in future own-sources of 48
cents. The impact on debt service has the expected sign but it is not significant. Govern-
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ment investment reacts positively with a future increment of 45 cents and government
consumption with 3 cents. Notice that these impacts are higher in comparison with the
responses due to innovations in intergovernmental grants. This fact can be explained
bearing inmind thatwhen government revenues come from local taxation and not from
an external source e.g., intergovernmental grants, voters can force to local governments
to increase productive spending due to a higher level of accountability (Martínez, 2016).
The impact of innovations on government spending in Colombia is thus quite similar
to the reported effects for the United States (51 cents) and Japan (38 cents), but large in
magnitude if one compare these values with the ones for Germany (27 cents) and Spain
(26 cents).
As suggested by the previous studies, it is also instructive to calculate the responses
to permanent innovations (Bessho and Ogawa, 2015; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro,
2012; Buettner, 2009; Buettner and Wildasin, 2006). The bottom of the Table 6 reports
those present value responses. Notice that a permanent positive unit innovation in
both government consumption and investment is followed by an increment in grants
of 77 cents and 58 cents, respectively, supporting again the existence of a soft-budget
constraint problem. In addition, future own-source revenues increase by 60 cents and
by 28 cents to a unit permanent innovation in government consumption and govern-
ment investment, respectively. These impacts are similar to the ones computed for US
municipalities where the response of own-source revenues to a permanent innovation
in total local spending attains 57 cents (Buettner and Wildasin, 2006). Moreover, these
effects are also similar to the point estimates reported by Bessho and Ogawa (2015) for
the Japanese municipalities (51 cents), and by Buettner (2009) for the German munici-
palities (43 cents).15 This could imply that, in average, Colombianmunicipalities do not
face a clear limited fiscal autonomy in terms of capacity to increase their own-source
revenues, in contrast to the ideas presented by Bird (2012) and Acosta and Bird (2005).
It is also interesting to assess the response of primary surplus to innovations in each
fiscal variable in order to check whether the Colombian municipalities commit to sat-
isfy an intertemporal budget constraint. Indeed, summing up the responses of fiscal
variables that constitute the primary surplus, it follows that the absolute value of the
changes is close to unity in all cases, but not for debt service (see Table 7). Accord-
ing to Buettner and Wildasin (2006) and Buettner (2009), the latter result in which the
15Surprisingly, for Spain, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2012) report a negative and statistically re-
sponse of own-source revenues (-31 cents) to a permanent innovation in general expenditures.
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fiscal balance is not achieved in response to innovations in debt services, could reflect
temporal fluctuations in this fiscal variable. Notice that the present value response of
debt services to a unit innovation in itself is -0.55 COP, which implies that 0.45 COP of
this innovation is permanent. If one compares this value with the present value of the
change in primary surplus (0.44) due to a unit innovation in debt services, then one
can claim that this result is in line with the predictions derived from an intertemporal
budget constraint approach (Bessho and Ogawa, 2015; Buettner and Wildasin, 2006).
7.2. Additional results: Decomposing the municipal sample
In this subsection, I proceed to assess whether the above results about fiscal adjustment
at the local level in Colombia change when I decompose the municipal sample bearing
in mind differences in population levels, local GDP per capita and degree of fiscal de-
centralization.16. A common perception in the economic literature is that Colombian
municipalities have profound disparities, different natural resource abundance, partial
fiscal decentralization, high levels of public sector corruption, limited economic oppor-
tunities for people, distinct growth rates and almost no discretion on public spending
(Martínez, 2016; Bird, 2012). In this sense, for instance, it is possible that larger or richer
cities follow different patterns of fiscal adjustment since they could have access to more
resources and receive more political support from the national government.
Table 8 shows the implied present value responses with respect to city size. I de-
compose the sample in quartiles using the long-run distribution of population as in
Buettner and Wildasin (2006). I only report the results for large cities (top quartile)
and small cities (bottom quartile). From the comparison of the point estimates between
subsamples, it follows that indeed large cities respond increasing their own-source rev-
enues in a greater extent than the small cities to a temporal positive unit innovation
in both government consumption and government investment with a value of 33 cents
and 15 cents, respectively. Surprisingly, the impact of unexpected changes in both own-
source revenues and grants on government spending are quite similar regardless of the
size of the city. Notice that, in general, the volatility of government expenditures, debt
service and own-source revenues in small cities is greater than in large municipalities.
These results could imply that large cities are in a better position to ensure themselves
16Here, I define the degree of fiscal decentralization using the fiscal decentralization index prepared
annually by the National Planning Department. In general terms, this index takes into account fis-
cal autonomy indicators, in terms of transfer dependency, ability to generate own-source revenues,
administrative capacities, among others variables.
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against common and idiosyncratic shocks. Despite this fact note that, however, the
negative impact on own-source revenues of unexpected changes in grants is only sta-
tistically significant for municipalities in the top quartile, giving as result a reduction of
9 cents in response to a temporal unit innovation in intergovernmental transfers. These
estimates could imply that the current fiscal scheme generates perverse incentives in
those local governments.
Furthermore, using the local GDP per capita17 as an indicator variable of local devel-
opment, Table 9 displays the present value responses for cities in the top and bottom
quartiles for the average local GDP per capita distribution over the period 2000-2009. It
is worth noting that for municipalities in the bottom quartile, grants from the national
government respond to a greater extent than for municipalities in the top quartile to
innovations in government investment. This impact could be explained by the fact that
grants in Colombia are distributed following constitutional rules which are based on
social indicators e.g., education attainment, mortality rates, poverty level, so relatively,
the majority of grants are allocated to poor municipalities in order to close profound
prosperity gaps. At the same time, and in contrast with common wisdom, it seems
that poor cities increase their own-source revenues to a higher extent in response to
innovation in local public spending.
In addition, I also exploit the variation in the average fiscal decentralization index-
FDI- prepared by theNational PlanningDepartment over the period 2000-2013 to assess
whether municipalities with better administrative capacities, higher fiscal effort, and
lower dependence on grants, follow a different pattern in terms of fiscal adjustments.
Table 10 reports, for instance, that a 1 COP positive innovation in grants is followed
by a rise of 42 cents in government investment for municipalities in the top quartile
for the average FDI distribution, whereas by 21 cents in the same fiscal variable for
municipalities in the bottom quartile. Moreover, as expected, grants for municipalities
in the bottom 25% react in a greater extent to innovations in local spending than for
governments in the top quartile. It turns out that intergovernmental grants are going
to the more needed municipalities, in order to close their fiscal gaps. Likewise, the
response of own-source revenues to innovations in government consumption is higher
for municipalities in the top quartile than for the ones at the bottom, suggesting that,
indeed, tax autonomy is an important instrument for fiscal stabilization.
17The estimations of municipal GDP are obtained from the Center for Economic Development Studies-
CEDE (Universidad de Los Andes).
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8. Conclusions
In this paper, using data over the period 1985-2015, I analyze how local governments
in Colombia react to innovations in the fiscal variables that compose their budgets.
Using a vector error-correction model I identify the level of discretion in policymak-
ing at the local level in terms of fiscal reaction functions. Contrary to the widespread
view of weaker sub-national units in developing economies, in terms of tax autonomy
and dependency on intergovernmental grants to finance local public spending, I find
that in line with the results for developed countries, government investment is highly
volatile and responds significantly to innovations in all other budgetary components,
and that intergovernmental grants react remarkably to increases in government spend-
ing, implying soft-budget constraint problems. Likewise, I show that the response of
own-source revenues to innovations in government spending in large cities is higher
than their small counterparts, a difference one cannot see in the United States and Ger-
many, supporting the idea of fiscal disparities across Colombianmunicipalities and the
necessity of intergovernmental grants to close these gaps.
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A. Appendix: Implied present value responses
I calculate the implied present value responses according to Buettner and Wildasin
(2006) and Bessho and Ogawa (2015). The vector error-correction model is given by the
following set of equations:
∆Xit = θDi,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
Ωj∆Xi,t−j + uit
where Xit = (GCit, GIit, DSit, Rit, Tit)′ and ψ = (1, 1, 1,−1,−1) forms the known
cointegrating vector. Hence, Dit = ψ′Xit. Using the fact that I can write the fiscal
deficit as Di,t−1 = ψ∆Xi,t−1 +Di,t−2, following Bohn (1991) and Buettner and Wildasin
(2006), I set up a first-order VAR to computed impulse-response functions:
Zi,t = FZi,t−1 + vi,t
such that
F ≡

Ω1 + θψ
′ Ω2 + θψ′ Ω3 + θψ′ Ω4 + θψ′ θ
I 0 0 0 0
0 I 0 0 0
0 0 I 0
...
0 · · · 0 ψ′ 1

, Zt ≡

∆Xt
∆Xt−1
∆Xt−2
∆Xt−3
Dt−4

, vt ≡

ut
0
...
0

where F is a (21 × 21) matrix, I is a (5 × 5) identity matrix and 0 is a (5 × 5) zero
matrix. Thus, the prediction of the k-period ahead value of Zi,t in response to a unit
innovation in period t is given by:
Zˆt+k = F
kvi
where vi identifies the i-th budget component in which the innovation takes place.
Using a row-selection vector hj , which identifies the j-th element of interest included
in the vector Zt+k, it is possible to compute the present value of the response of the j-th
budget elementwith respect to a unit innovation in the i-th component, in the following
way:
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pˆi(j, i) =
∑
k≥1
hjρ
kFkvi = hjρF[1− ρF]−1vi
where ρ = 1/(1+r) is the discount factor and r is the given interest rate (fixed at 3%).
The responses to permanent innovations are calculated as follows:
pˆi(j, i)
1− pˆi(j, i)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1985-2015, 918 Municipalities)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
G. Consumption 0.097 0.074 0.000 1.683
G. Investment 0.407 0.521 0.000 12.01
Debt Services 0.005 0.015 0.000 0.907
Grants 0.378 0.429 0.000 9.609
Own-Source Revenues 0.118 0.184 0.000 3.667
Deficit 0.013 0.186 -5.481 5.413
∆ G. Consumption 0.004 0.036 -1.081 1.064
∆ G. Investment 0.043 0.284 -8.027 8.954
∆ Debt Services 0.000 0.017 -0.904 0.892
∆ Grants 0.028 0.216 -4.982 5.411
∆ Own-Source Revenues 0.013 0.116 -2.686 1.890
∆ Deficit 0.006 0.262 -8.651 9.224
Population (thousands) 36.42 240.0 0.664 7879
Note: Values expressed in per capita basis and in millions of 2008
Colombian Pesos (COP). The underlying data are from the National
Planning Department and the National Administrative Department of
Statistics.
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Table 2: Panel unit-root tests for municipalities
Lag order (p) (1) (2) (3)
Deficit -64.0∗∗∗ -37.1∗∗∗ -17.9∗∗∗
G. Consumption -17.8∗∗∗ -3.71∗∗∗ 1.76
G. Investment -14.9∗∗∗ 1.97 11.1
Debt Service -25.0∗∗∗ -7.12∗∗∗ 0.11
Grants -21.5∗∗∗ 0.86 5.73
Own Revenues 5.74 21.6 22.7
∆ G. Consumption -112 ∗∗∗ -70.3∗∗∗ -48.0∗∗∗
∆ G. Investment -106∗∗∗ -70.6 ∗∗∗ -37.6∗∗∗
∆ Debt Service -110∗∗∗ -68.3∗∗∗ -48.9∗∗∗
∆ Grants -118∗∗∗ -71.6∗∗∗ -47.8∗∗∗
∆ Own Revenues -75.2∗∗∗ -35.3∗∗∗ -12.9∗∗∗
Note: Fisher-type unit root tests using augmented
Dickey-Fuller statistics on each panel. Cross-sectional
means are removed. All tests include a time trend, ex-
cept for the Deficit. The inverse-normal Z statistic is
reported. The sample period is 1985-2015. The num-
ber of municipalities is 917. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Specification tests for lag order reduction
Lag length 4 3
∆ G. Consumption 53.75 [0.00] 151.7 [0.00]
∆ G. Investment 79.52 [0.00] 897.1 [0.00]
∆ Debt Services 411.4 [0.00] 609.9 [0.00]
∆ Grants 363.3 [0.00] 248.7 [0.00]
∆ Own-source revenues 124.2 [0.00] 401.0 [0.00]
Note: Likelihood-ratio statistics approximately χ2 distributed with 5 de-
grees of freedom. [ ]: p-values
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Table 4: Specification tests for municipality-fixed effects
Lag length 4 3
∆ G. Consumption 1012.3 [0.01] 885.02 [0.76]
∆ G. Investment 1139.6 [0.00] 1018.6 [0.01]
∆ Debt Services 240.98 [1.00] 188.26 [1.00]
∆ Grants 1184.0 [0.00] 1067.0 [0.00]
∆ Own-source revenues 876.95 [1.00] 807.64 [1.00]
Note: Likelihood-ratio statistics approximately χ2 distributed with 4580
degrees of freedom. [ ]: p-values
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Table 5: Estimates for the error correction term in Colombian municipalities
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G. Consumption G. Investment Debt Service Grants Own Revenues
θ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.07) (0.03)
Observations 19625 19625 19625 19625 19625
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.14
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Implied present value responses for Colombian municipalities
Innovation to
G. Consumption G. Investment Debt Service Grants Own Revenues
Response of
G. Consumption -0.38∗∗∗ -0.01 0.05 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
G. Investment 0.25∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗ -0.29∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.04) (0.18) (0.05) (0.07)
Debt Service 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.48∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20 -0.58∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.12) (0.04) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06)
Own Revenues 0.38∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.03 -0.48∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Response to permanent increase
G. Consumption -0.02 0.11 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
G. Investment 0.41∗∗ -0.66∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.38) (0.05) (0.11)
Debt Service 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.77∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.44 -0.02
(0.19) (0.08) (0.37) (0.11)
Own Revenues 0.60∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.07
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.04)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Present value of change in primary surplus in Colombian municipalities
Innovation to
G. Consumption G. Investment Debt Service Grants Own Revenues
Primary surplus 0.98 0.97 0.44 -0.97 -0.97
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Table 8: Implied present value responses with respect to city size
Innovation to
G. Consumption G. Investment Debt Services Grants Own Revenues
Large cities (top quartile)
Response of
G. Consumption -0.34∗∗∗ 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.05∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
G. Investment -0.02 -0.62∗∗∗ -0.51∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.10) (0.31) (0.08) (0.11)
Debt Services 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.54∗∗∗ -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Grants 0.38∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.12 -0.56∗∗∗ -0.08
(0.16) (0.09) (0.28) (0.07) (0.10)
Own Revenues 0.33∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.09∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07)
Response to permanent increase
G. Consumption 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.09∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.16) (0.04) (0.02)
G. Investment -0.03 -1.13∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.68) (0.10) (0.18)
Debt Services 0.17∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.20) (0.02) (0.01)
Grants 0.58∗∗ 0.47 0.24 -0.14
(0.24) (0.75) (0.59) (0.19)
Own Revenues 0.49∗∗∗ 0.47 -0.19 -0.20∗
(0.12) (0.72) (0.31) (0.10)
Small cities (bottom quartile)
Response of
Expenditures -0.40∗∗∗ -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02∗∗
(0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment -0.03 -0.78∗∗∗ -0.38 0.44∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.07) (0.25) (0.11) (0.12)
Debt Service 0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.62∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.29 0.12∗ -0.09 -0.48∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.25) (0.07) (0.23) (0.10) (0.11)
Own Revenues 0.29∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.09∗ -0.03 -0.55∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Response to permanent increase
Expenditures -0.07 0.07 0.03∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Investment 0.05 -0.97∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.56) (0.10) (0.24)
Debt Service 0.01∗∗ 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.47 0.47∗∗ -0.22 0.26
(0.41) (0.22) (0.56) (0.25)
Own Revenues 0.49∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.25∗ -0.07
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Implied present value responses with respect to local GDP
Innovation to
Expenditures Investment Debt Service Grants Own Revenues
Local GDP (top quartile)
Response of
Expenditures -0.31∗∗∗ 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.02∗
(0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment 0.52∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.51 0.27∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.06) (0.40) (0.06) (0.10)
Debt Service 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00∗ -0.46∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.96∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.30 -0.70∗∗∗ -0.07
(0.20) (0.06) (0.38) (0.05) (0.07)
Own Revenues 0.24∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.49∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.02) (0.14) (0.03) (0.06)
Response to permanent increase
Expenditures 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.03∗∗
(0.04) (0.21) (0.03) (0.02)
Investment 0.75∗∗ -0.95 0.89∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.74) (0.11) (0.15)
Debt Service 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Grants 1.39∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.56 -0.14
(0.29) (0.10) (0.70) (0.15)
Own Revenues 0.35∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.20 0.00
(0.12) (0.11) (0.26) (0.10)
Local GDP (bottom quartile)
Response of
Expenditures -0.50∗∗∗ -0.01 0.09∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment 0.34∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ 0.12 0.23∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.06) (0.31) (0.06) (0.11)
Debt Service 0.01 0.00 -0.50∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.43∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.48∗ -0.68∗∗∗ -0.14∗
(0.11) (0.05) (0.27) (0.05) (0.08)
Own Revenues 0.37∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.19 -0.03 -0.48∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.07)
Response to permanent increase
Expenditures -0.03 0.17∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03)
Investment 0.70∗∗∗ 0.24 0.70∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.62) (0.11) (0.17)
Debt Service 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Grants 0.87∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.52∗ -0.27∗
(0.18) (0.07) (0.52) (0.16)
Own Revenues 0.74∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.38 -0.11∗∗
(0.18) (0.07) (0.35) (0.10)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Implied present value responses with respect to a FD Index
Innovation to
Expenditures Investment Debt Service Grants Own Revenues
FD Index (top quartile)
Response of
Expenditures -0.28∗∗∗ 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment 0.08 -0.77∗∗∗ -0.41 0.42∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.09) (0.34) (0.11) (0.12)
Debt Service 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Grants 0.34 0.15∗ 0.37 -0.52∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.27) (0.09) (0.35) (0.11) (0.10)
Own Revenues 0.49∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.22 -0.02 -0.36∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.04) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07)
Response to permanent increase
Expenditures 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.16) (0.02) (0.01)
Investment 0.11 -0.90 0.88∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.76) (0.10) (0.15)
Debt Service 0.12∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Grants 0.48 0.62∗∗ 0.79 0.02
(0.36) (0.24) (0.74) (0.16)
Own Revenues 0.68∗∗ 0.26 -0.47 -0.05
(0.17) (0.18) (0.35) (0.10)
FD Index (bottom quartile)
Response of
Expenditures -0.49∗∗∗ -0.01 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment 0.29∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗ -0.08 0.21∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
Debt Service 0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.61∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
Grants 0.46∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -0.10
(0.11) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Own Revenues 0.29∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ -0.04 -0.51∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
Response to permanent increase
Expenditures -0.02 0.03 0.06∗∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Investment 0.57∗∗ -0.21 0.69∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.22) (0.14) (0.18)
Debt Service 0.01∗∗ 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Grants 0.92∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗ -0.22
(0.20) (0.07) (0.18) (0.15)
Own Revenues 0.57∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ -0.14
(0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Trends of fiscal variables in Colombian municipalities
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Note: Values are expressed in trillions of 2008 Colombian Pesos (COP). The underlying data are from the
National Planning Department and the National Administrative Department of Statistics.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions
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Note: Reduced-form impulse response functions assuming no contemporaneous effects.
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Table 11: Estimation results for the panel VECM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆GCi,t ∆GIi,t ∆DSi,t ∆Ti,t ∆Ri,t
Di,t−1 -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.49∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆GCi,t−1 -0.36∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.58∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.15 (0.11) 0.07 (0.05)
∆GIi,t−1 0.01 (0.01) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) -0.17∗∗ (0.07) -0.11∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆DSi,t−1 0.05 (0.03) -0.06 (0.24) -0.62∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.19 (0.23) -0.15∗∗∗ (0.06)
∆Ti,t−1 0.00 (0.01) 0.11 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) -0.28∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆Ri,t−1 0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.11) 0.00 (0.00) 0.17∗∗ (0.09) -0.33∗∗∗ (0.06)
∆GCi,t−2 -0.16∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.70∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.28∗∗ (0.12) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.05)
∆GIi,t−2 0.00 (0.01) -0.33∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) -0.06 (0.06) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆DSi,t−2 0.06 (0.04) -0.47 (0.31) -0.40∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.41 (0.30) -0.18∗∗∗ (0.07)
∆Ti,t−2 0.01 (0.01) 0.19∗∗ (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) -0.19∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆Ri,t−2 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.12) 0.00 (0.00) 0.21∗∗ (0.08) -0.15∗∗ (0.06)
∆GCi,t−3 -0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.08 (0.12) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.11) 0.04 (0.05)
∆GIi,t−3 0.01∗ (0.00) -0.28∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.06) -0.11∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆DSi,t−3 0.07∗ (0.04) -0.71∗∗ (0.33) -0.24∗∗∗ (0.06) 0.07 (0.25) -0.15∗∗ (0.07)
∆Ti,t−3 -0.01 (0.01) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) -0.15∗∗ (0.07) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03)
∆Ri,t−3 0.01 (0.01) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.00 (0.00) 0.08 (0.07) 0.01 (0.05)
∆GCi,t−4 -0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.25∗∗ (0.10) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.02 (0.13) 0.04 (0.04)
∆GIi,t−4 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.05 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.06) -0.06∗∗ (0.02)
∆DSi,t−4 0.05∗∗ (0.03) -0.32 (0.20) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.05) -0.07 (0.15) -0.05 (0.05)
∆Ti,t−4 -0.01 (0.01) -0.09 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) -0.20∗∗∗ (0.06) 0.03 (0.03)
∆Ri,t−4 0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) -0.05 (0.09) 0.01 (0.05)
_cons 0.01∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
N 19625 19625 19625 19625 19625
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.14
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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